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Abstract
Conceptually, the stock market is strong form efficient in the long term. However, in practice, there 
are various forms of market anomalies that undermine the accuracy of the efficient market hypothesis. 
One factor suspected as the cause of market inefficiency is herding behavior. Investors herd when they 
imitate the actions of other investors. This behavior occurs when there is a continuous interaction 
among rational investors that prevents them from seeking information about market fundamentals. 
This study provides new insights by including information asymmetry as a moderating variable. This 
research examines the phenomenon of herding behavior in the Indonesia Stock Exchange as well 
as examines directly the effect of information asymmetry on herding behavior. The period of study 
is 2008 using time series of daily stocks data that actively traded in the capital market. Results of 
this study find that investor tends to follow market consensus when price changes at the low level, 
but when there is large price swing market participant acts independently from other investors. 
Interestingly, this study finds that information asymmetry is a necessary condition for the existence 
of herding behavior.
Keywords: behavioral finance, herding behavior, information asymmetry, information 
cascades
Abstrak
Secara konseptual, dalam jangka panjang pasar modal bersifat efisien bentuk kuat. Namun, dalam 
praktik, terdapat berbagai bentuk anomali pasar yang menurunkan akurasi dari hipotesis pasar efisien. 
Salah satu faktor yang diduga sebagai penyebab inefisiensi pasar yaitu perilaku kawanan (herding 
behavior). Investor berperilaku herd ketika mereka mengimitasi tindakan investor lain. Perilaku ini 
terjadi ketika terdapat interaksi yang terus-menerus di antara investor rasional yang menghalangi 
mereka untuk mencari informasi mengenai fundamental pasar. Penelitian ini memberikan wawasan 
baru dengan memasukkan asimetri informasi sebagai sebuah variabel moderasi. Penelitian ini menguji 
fenomena perilaku kawanan di Bursa Efek Indonesia sekaligus secara langsung menguji dampak 
dari asimetri informasi terhadap perilaku kawanan. Penelitian ini menggunakan tahun 2008 sebagai 
periode penelitian dengan menggunakan data harian atas saham-saham yang diperdagangkan secara 
aktif di pasar modal. Hasil penelitian ini menemukan bahwa investor cenderung untuk mengikuti 
konsensus pasar ketika terjadi perubahan harga pada tingkat rendah, namun ketika terdapat lonjakan 
harga yang besar, partisipan pasar bertindak secara independen dari investor lain. Menariknya, 
penelitian ini menemukan bahwa asimetri informasi merupakan kondisi yang diperlukan bagi 
keberadaan perilaku kawanan.
Kata kunci: keuangan keperilakuan, perilaku kawanan, asimetri informasi, information 
cascades
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information when they observe the behavior 
of other investors. Informational externalities 
become very powerful when investors decide 
to ignore the signal of information that 
they own and choose to imitate actions and 
decisions taken by other investors.
Several studies have been conducted to 
estimate herding behavior (e.g. Cipriani and 
Guarino 2008; Fu and Lin 2010; Degirmen 
et al. 2012). Gunawan et al. (2011) found 
that in Indonesia, herding behavior occurs in 
a market stress condition, whereas in normal 
condition or in a condition of very high stock 
return, investor behavior tends to be more 
rational. By using the model of Lakonishok 
et al. (1992), Setiyono et al. (2013) found 
that there is institutional herding in Indonesia 
capital market. The majority of these studies 
examined herding behavior in capital markets 
done by individual investors, institutions, as 
well as analysts/professionals. However, there 
are few empirical researches that examine 
effects of information asymmetry on herding 
behavior. Kremer (2011) has studied causes 
and effects of herding behavior. Kremer (2011) 
showed that information asymmetry does 
not affect herding behavior. The weakness of 
Kremer (2011) is to use firm size as a proxy 
of information asymmetry in which firm size 
does not measure asymmetric information 
directly. In fact, herding behavior arises 
because of information asymmetry among 
market participants. This study attempts to 
improve Kremer (2011) by using the bid-ask 
spread as a proxy of information asymmetry.
The objective of this study is to 
investigate the existence of herding behavior 
in Indonesia capital market during the crisis 
period. The main contribution of this study 
is introducing information asymmetry into a 
model for detecting herding behavior based on 
Chang et al. (2000) framework. Moreover, this 
study uses the model of bid-ask spreads for 
estimating the level of information asymmetry 
among market participants.
Using daily data in 2008, this study 
documents a weak evidence of herding 
behavior in Indonesia capital market. This 
research finds that at the low level of price 
INTRODUCTION
According to  f inancial  market 
microstructure theory, investors will learn 
about fundamental of market step by step 
until the difference between market price and 
fundamental value of the market disappeared. 
It happens because each investor uses private 
information about fundamental of stock to 
make an investment decision, so stock price 
reflects information owned by the investor. 
This means that stock market is strong form 
efficient in the long term.
However, in practice, there are various 
forms of market anomalies that undermine the 
accuracy of the efficient market hypothesis. 
One factor suspected as the cause of market 
inefficiency is herding behavior. Investors 
herd when they imitate the actions of other 
investors. This behavior occurs when there is a 
continuous interaction among rational investors 
that prevent them from seeking information 
about market fundamental. Herding behavior 
arises because the investor does not act in 
accordance with his private information, but 
based on actions taken by other investors. 
This herding behavior causes social learning 
process stops. Herding behavior is believed 
to occur in financial markets (Devenow and 
Welch 1996).
Further, Devenow and Welch (1996) 
explain that there are three reasons for herding. 
First, the motivation of payoff-externalities 
encourages investors to make transactions at 
the same time in order to get profit from a higher 
stock liquidity. The second motivation is the 
reputational effect. The success of institutional 
investors is often judged by comparing their 
performance from a benchmark. For this 
reason, investment managers often hide behind 
herd behavior in order to get performance near 
to its benchmark. On average, herding behavior 
eliminates opportunities for investment 
managers to earn performance exceeding its 
benchmark. But, herding behavior provides 
protection for their reputation from declining 
performance below benchmark. The third 
reason is informational externalities. It 
means that investors often have incomplete 
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changes, investor tends to follow the crowds 
(i.e. herding). Conversely, when prices change 
drastically, there is no herding behavior. 
Investors tend to not follow the crowds when 
market prices largely swing. In addition, this 
study finds that information asymmetry has an 
important role in herding behavior.
LITERATURE REVIEW AND 
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Behavioral Finance
Behavioral finance attempts to seek 
evidence and explanation about someone’s 
economic decisions by combining behavioral 
and cognitive psychology theory with economic 
and conventional finance theory. Behavioral 
finance is a paradigm where emotions and 
subjective factors have an important role in 
investment decisions. Investor’s decisions are 
influenced by beliefs and certain choice. This 
view differs from economic theory that gives 
more space to human preferences, but almost 
no place for their ignorance or knowledge, 
their feelings of hope, doubt and fear, as well 
as the power of their imagination (Shackle 
1942). The assumption of behavioral finance 
is information structure and characteristics 
of market participants influence individual 
investment decisions as well as the market 
(Baker and Nofsinger 2010).
In terms of investment decision, 
behavioral finance uses the assumption that 
individual is not entirely rational because the 
decisions are based on individual preferences. 
Several studies used this assumption to examine 
the existence of behavioral bias (e.g. DeBondt 
and Thaler 1985; Shefrin and Statman 1985; 
Hirshleifer 2001). Barberis and Thaler (2003) 
provide an excellent literature review about 
types of behavioral biases done by investor and 
explore how these biases might affect decision 
making and the financial markets. Psychology 
literature noted that individual conducts 
systematic errors in their thinking, e.g. they 
might over confidence, focus on existing 
information, and so forth. Herding behavior is 
one of the forms of behavioral finance.
Herding Behavior
Our day-to-day activities, including in-
vestment and financial activities, are often 
influenced by others. Thoughts, feelings, and 
actions can be influenced by others through 
multiple media such as words, observing the 
actions of others (i.e. observation number of 
demand and supply), and observations on the 
consequences of actions (such as a person’s 
payoff or market price).
Investors are said to herd if they would 
have taken an investment decision without 
knowing investment decisions of other inves-
tors, but when other investors have decided 
to not invest, neither do they. Thus, herding 
behavior occurs when knowledge about in-
vestment decision of other investors changes 
their investment decision from not investing in 
making the investment, or vice versa.
In psychology, imitation action is often 
considered to be nature of human. Hirshleifer 
(2001) showed that ‘conformity’ has encour-
aged someone to replicate the actions of anoth-
er person around them. The imitation behavior 
arises through interactive communication be-
tween individuals both explicitely—through 
talking to each other directly (Shiller 1995)—
or tacitly—through observation, just like as in 
the case of fashion (Bikhchandani et al. 1992).
An alternative explanation of herding 
behavior is ‘rational herding’. Devenow and 
Welch (1996) argue that herding behavior 
arises because of rational considerations i.e. 
it is more sensible for the investor to mimic 
decision that taken by other investors in 
order to get an informational advantage. This 
rational consideration occurs when a person 
(a) has no private information, (b) has private 
information but hesitated with the quality of 
the information, (c) considers that ability of 
other people to process information is better, 
and (d) believes that other investors have 
better information.
Rational considerations can be explained 
from the viewpoint of career and reputation. 
Investment managers and financial analysts are 
required to maintain their career and reputation. 
When their performance is evaluated by 
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comparing it with other investment managers, 
it is quite reasonable for investment managers 
who have lower ability or reputation to 
replicate other investment manager’s actions 
who have higher ability and reputation in order 
to improve their image (Scharfstein and Stein 
1990). However, investment managers who 
have higher ability and reputation may also 
choose to follow investment decisions taken by 
the majority of existing investment managers, 
despite suboptimal, when they perceived that 
risk of potential failure is greater than the 
potential for success if they did alone (Graham 
1999).
Intentional herding model assumes that 
amount of information available and reliable 
in the market is very little, and investors be-
come hesitant to make a decision and finally 
they decide to follow on other investor’s deci-
sion. In contrast, in unintentional herding, in-
vestors believe that they have reliable informa-
tion, and then they interpret in the same way 
until finally take the same decision. So, both 
intentional and unintentional herding behav-
iors are strongly associated with uncertainty 
about the availability of information.
Lakonishok et al. (1992) examine 
behavior of herding on the NYSE. They 
separate stocks based on market capitalization, 
i.e. stocks with low and high market 
capitalization. The purpose of this separation 
is to see what kind of herding behavior, 
whether intentional or unintentional. Stocks 
with low market capitalization tend to drive 
intentional herding because of information 
available to small companies is very limited 
and less reliable. In stocks with high market 
capitalization, intentional herding is driven by 
the high degree of uniformity of information 
between investors, so they take the same 
decision. Lakonishok et al. (1992) show that 
herding behavior is more common in small 
firms than large firms.
There are several studies on herding be-
havior in developed and emerging markets. 
Choe et al. (1999) conduct a study of herd-
ing behavior in the international market. They 
found strong evidence of the existence of herd-
ing among foreign institutions in Korea before 
the financial crisis in 1997. Grinblatt and Kelo-
jaru (2001) found that investors in Finland 
prefer to invest in stocks that are close to their 
homebase. In another word, familiarity factor 
has determined investor decision.
Cipriani and Guarino (2014) developed 
a new methodology to estimate informational 
herding behavior. They argued that there is a 
gap between theoretical framework of herding 
behavior and its empirical research. This gap 
arises because of the difficulty of obtaining 
data on private information held by the inves-
tor. But, this model is too complex and needs 
more detail information about transactions.
Chang (2014) examined the relationship 
between social interactions, herding behavior, 
and bubbles. He found that herding behavior 
arises naturally when there are strong enough 
social interactions among individual investors, 
and in an extremely small bubble, herding be-
havior tends to increase when the social inter-
actions among traders are strong.
Information Asymmetry
Information asymmetry occurs when 
there is an imbalance of information among 
investors. Agency theory implies the existence 
of information asymmetry between managers 
as agent and shareholders as principal. 
Information asymmetry arises when the 
manager is better informed concerning 
internal and prospects of the company than 
shareholders and other stakeholders. Thus, 
information asymmetry arises when one party 
has knowledge that is not possessed by the 
others.
Information asymmetry in the capital 
market is shown by the adverse selection 
problem faced by market makers (dealers) 
when dealing with more informed investors. 
Measurement of information asymmetry 
in the stock market is often proxied with 
liquidity. Liquidity in the market has a 
variety of definitions and interpretations. 
The simplest notion of liquidity is the ability 
to conduct transactions without significant 
costs. Kyle (1985) broke down liquidity into 
three components, namely tightness, depth, 
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and resiliency. Tightness refers to deviation of 
stock prices from their efficient price, i.e. price 
that should occur in equilibrium. Dealers often 
set bid and ask prices slightly above and below 
equilibrium value. The market is said to be 
liquid perfectly if spread between bid and ask 
prices is set to be zero, so broker could buy and 
sell at the same price. Tightness component is 
often called as bid-ask spread.
Model of information asymmetry 
(e.g. Copeland and Galai 1983) assumes 
that there are three types of agents in the 
market, that are traders with excess of 
information (informed traders), traders with 
little information (uninformed traders), and 
risk neutral specialist. Traders with excessive 
information will make transaction based on 
their private information that is not reflected 
in the stock price, and they are speculative. 
Traders with excess of information come to 
the market because they have information 
regarding the future value of assets that have 
not been published, while traders with little 
information—or better known as liquidity 
traders—trade to adjust their portfolio in order 
to optimize their cash flow. Specialists are 
market participants who can act as broker or 
dealer. Brokerage transaction is aimed to meet 
investment orders from his clients, while a 
dealer has an authority to make transactions 
for himself. Specialist is assumed to have 
identical information with liquidity traders. 
In this condition, dealers face the problem 
of adverse selection and face a potential loss 
when trading with informed traders. In order 
to cover losses from more informed traders, 
the dealer should increase spread from liquid 
traders. 
In Indonesia capital market, a dealer 
also serves as a broker so they are called as 
broker-dealer. This dual function causes the 
quoted spread not fully reflect dealer spread 
as in the developed capital market (e.g. New 
York Stock Exchange). However, this theory 
is still relevant to be implemented in Indonesia 
capital market because broker-dealer also carry 
out transactions for themselves, so they do set 
a bid price and ask the price before putting 
the order. Broker-dealer have a potential loss 
when trading with the informed trader (e.g. 
foreign investors, or institutional investors). 
Otherwise, broker-dealer face potential 
advantage when dealing with uninformed 
investors.
The second component of liquidity is the 
depth that represents trading volume at quoted 
prices. Technically, the bid-depth is a number 
of shares to be purchased by a specialist or a 
dealer at the current bid-price, while the ask-
depth is a number of shares to be sold by a 
specialist or a dealer at the current ask-price. 
Based on the perspective of market liquidity, 
depth indicates the number of shares that can 
be traded without effect on the market price. 
Graphically, the two components of liquidity 
can be described as follows:
Figure 1
The Component of Liquidity 
(Engle and Lange 1997)
The third component is resiliency, i.e. the speed 
of a price to return to efficient (equilibrium) 
price after any deviation or price jump. In a 
highly liquid market, the stock price will return 
to the efficient level quickly after temporary 
price jump that does not affect the value of a 
stock. However, this component is very difficult 
to be measured because of a continuous flow of 
information into the market. So, it is difficult 
to determine the speed of price jump to return 
to efficient price for specific information. In 
other words, it is very difficult to control other 
factors that go into the market.
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The Influence of Information Asymmetry 
on Herding Behavior
Lakonishok et al. (1992) define herding as the 
tendency that a group of investors to buy (sell) 
a particular stock in line with other traders, 
but this behavior will be different when they 
make investment decisions independently. For 
example, an investor imitates other investors 
when he decided not to invest in a particular 
stock, but after observed that other investors 
buying the stock, then he changes his beliefs 
and decides to invest too.
When investment decisions are influenced 
by other investors, they probably mimic the 
wrong investment decisions. Suppose there 
are a hundred investors who have their own 
beliefs—which may be different—about 
the potential profitability when investing in 
emerging market. Assume that 20 investors 
believe that emerging market is a promising 
market for investment (profitable), while 80 
investors believe that investing in emerging 
market will not provide any benefits. Each 
investor is convinced to their valuation 
about emerging market and they did not 
know what the other investors’ valuation. If 
every investor’s knowledge and belief were 
collected, collectively they will decide that 
investing in emerging market is not a good 
idea. However, when there is an investor that 
comes from the 20 optimistic investors decides 
to invest in emerging market, then some of 
the pessimistic investors change their belief 
and decide to invest in emerging market. It 
encourages the emergence of snowballing 
phenomenon, and eventually, 100 investors 
invest in emerging market. Then, if emerging 
market is not profitable, they will out of the 
emerging market concurrently.
These illustrations presented by Bikhchandani 
and Sharma (2001) indicate that herding 
behavior occurs because of differences in 
the information held by each investor. This 
phenomenon is referred as information 
cascade, which is a phenomenon that occurs 
when investors observe other investors’ 
actions and then take the same option and 
ignore their signal information. A cascade will 
develop when investors ignore their private 
information and imitate the action taken by 
another investor (Easley and Kleinberg 2010).
Initially, herding behavior is observed as the 
effect of psychological factors. But, economists 
have modelled rational behavior of investors. 
Spreading of herding behavior in the market 
will drive collective action that affects market 
efficiency adversely, regardless of herding 
behavior motivation. If many investors decide 
to ignore their private information and want to 
be free riders of other investors, it will speed 
up informational cascade (Banerjee 1992; 
Bikhchandani et al. 1992), so that the process 
of information aggregation in security prices 
is slower.
Hypothesis Development
Conventional economics assumes that 
everyone thinks about himself and is not 
affected by his surrounding environment. 
But, behavioral economics recognizes 
that humans often follow other people 
when making decisions. This condition 
underlies the existence of behavioral finance. 
Behavioral finance is a new alternative 
paradigm for analyzing behavior of market 
participants through learning the mistakes 
that have been done by the investor when 
processing information. Moreover, in terms 
of psychological, behavioral finance also 
describes the causes of bias or deviation from 
efficient market hypothesis (Daniel and Titman 
1999). 
Herding behavior can be influenced by 
market conditions at the time when it occurs. 
Changes in market conditions will be followed 
by changes in investor behavior, changes 
in economic activity, and the government’s 
policy that is aimed to stimulate or stabilize 
market activity in the market. Christie and 
Huang (1995) stated that the decision-making 
process made by market participants depend 
on overall market conditions. During normal 
periods, rational asset pricing models predict 
that the dispersion of returns will increase with 
an increase in the absolute value of market 
return because the individual investor will 
trade based on their private information. When 
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market conditions change extremely, people 
tend to ignore their personal judgement and 
decide to follow market consensus.
Degirmen et al. (2012) examine herding 
behavior in developing and developed markets. 
They argued that quality of information is 
one of the factors that differentiate herding 
behavior between developing and developed 
markets. The accuracy of information signals 
in market influences herding behavior. The 
more informative signal received by investors, 
herding behavior tends to get smaller because 
investors trust their private information. Further, 
Degirmen et al.  (2012) stated that distribution 
of market information in developing market 
is relatively less informative than developed 
markets. In other words, the quality of market 
information in developed markets is better 
than developing markets. Therefore, herding 
behavior is more common in developing 
markets due to relatively low of information 
precision.
Kallinterakis (2009) examines herding 
behavior in Vietnam, a thin market—that 
is a market where shares are rarely traded. 
A thin market is one characteristic of an 
emerging market. Kallinterakis (2009) 
found that phenomenon of herding behavior 
in thin markets is caused by illiquidity of 
market structure. Indonesia capital market is 
characterized as a thin market, the market that 
some securities are traded passively (Hartono 
2010). This condition drives the phenomenon 
called as non-synchronous trading. Indonesia 
Stock Exchange (IDX), which also has 
characteristics of an emerging market (World 
Economic Forum 2015), may show herding 
behavior in the market. This research states an 
alternative hypothesis as follows:
H1: There is herding behavior in 
Indonesia Stock Exchange.
Bickchandani et al. (1992) hold a fundamental 
theory of informational cascade that is often 
referred by many researchers in financial 
markets. According to them, informational 
cascade occurs when individual’s actions are 
not dependent on his private information. 
When cascade begins, the decision of herding 
investors does not carry any information 
because they ignore their private signals. 
Therefore, informational cascade continues 
and causes blocking of information.
The informational cascade is triggered by 
information uncertainty in the capital market. 
Information uncertainty is not only about 
the real value of the asset being traded but 
also regarding the quality of information. 
Under uncertainty, market makers tend to 
think that informed investors have better 
information (i.e. information asymmetry) that 
encourages them to follow the actions taken by 
informed investors. Moreover, in conditions 
of information asymmetry, fears of making a 
wrong decision and potential loss to be borne 
by investors interfere their ability to analyze 
rationally, and ultimately investors tend to 
converge market consensus in order to relieve 
their discomfort by imitating other investors’ 
behavior. So, herding occurs as a response 
to the uncertainty and individual perceptions 
about his unknowing: people may follow the 
crowd because they think that people in the 
crowd have better information (Keynes 1930).
Lobao and Serra (2007) argue that herding 
behavior occurring in emerging markets can 
be attributed by an incomplete regulatory 
framework, particularly in terms of 
transparency of information. Low level of 
information disclosure and quality drive 
emergence of uncertainty in the market, cast 
doubt on the reliability of public information, 
and consequently, it is hard to do the 
fundamental analysis.
Oktaviani and Martani (2006) examine 
disclosure level of multi-finance companies 
in Indonesia by using financial statements in 
2003 and 2004 as their object. Their research 
found that disclosure level of multifinance 
companies is 78.35% in 2004.  Even though 
there is slightly increasing disclosure level, 
but Oktaviani and Martani (2006) said that 
companies’ disclosure does not fully cover 
important information. 
In 2010, Ministry of Finance of the Re-
public of Indonesia published a master plan for 
capital market and nonbank financial industry 
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with the aim to build market and industry that 
is efficient, competitive, transparent, stable, 
and fulfil international standards. Several 
agendas and programs to improve Indonesia 
capital market quality during 2010-2014 ra-
tionalize the disclosure obligation for issuers 
companies, improve the effectiveness of E-
Reporting implementation, and encourage the 
industry to provide qualified information. The 
preparation of this master plan implies that 
level and quality of disclosure in Indonesia had 
not been satisfying. This argument is support-
ed by Tandiono and Martowidjojo (2013) who 
explored voluntary disclosure profile of fam-
ily businesses that are listed in IDX. By using 
financial reports in 2009-2011, their research 
found that family business tends to provide 
more information about firm background than 
other important information such as financial 
projection.
Studies of Oktaviani and Martani (2006) 
and Tandiono and Martowidjojo (2013), as 
well as the master plan of capital market 
published by Ministry of Finance of the 
Republic of Indonesia imply that disclosure 
quantity and quality in Indonesia are far from 
the ideal condition. This condition could 
potentially increase information asymmetry in 
Indonesia capital market. Based on arguments 
of Lobao and Serra (2007) and Keynes (1930), 
this study argues that information asymmetry 
influences herding behavior positively because 
of the doubt on information credibility. 
H2: Information asymmetry has a positive 
impact on herding behavior.
RESEARCH METHOD
Sampling
The object of this research is companies 
listed in IDX. Herding behavior is believed as 
one of the important elements in the behavior 
of financial markets, especially when the mar-
ket is stress (Hwang and Salmon 2004) such as 
the Asian crisis in 1998 and the global crisis in 
2008. Based on this argument, our study uses 
2008 as investigation period to estimate herd-
ing phenomenon.
This study takes daily data to examine 
the phenomenon of herding behavior. Total 
observations used for data analysis are 240 days 
in 2008. The reason for 2008 as the research 
object is the global crisis that affects IDX. 
According to the World Bank, total market 
capitalization of global stock markets before 
the 2008 global financial crisis reached $64 
trillion. This amount was almost halved by the 
2008 financial crisis. In three years following 
the crisis, stock markets partially recovered, 
reaching $45 trillion of market capitalization 
by end of 2011. This condition allegedly 
encouraged herding behavior. Purnomo and 
Figure 2
Movements of Stock Market Indexes in the Case of 2008 Global Financial Crisis 
(Purnomo and Rider 2014)
Puput Tri Komalasari, Informatin Asymmetry and Herding Behavior 78
Rider (2014) depicted fluctuation in Indonesia 
capital market during the 2008 global financial 
crisis:
By using time series of daily data, this 
study selects the object based on its liquidity. 
Specifically, sampling criteria used in this 
study is a company whose shares are actively 
traded in the IDX. This study defines actively 
traded stocks when trading frequency in one 
day is more than or equal to fifty transactions. 
Total observations in this study are 240 
days. The use of daily data is based on an 
argument of Christie and Huang (1995) that 
herding behavior often occurs in a short period 
of time (short term). Further, they said that 
herding behavior can be detected on the data 
with high frequency.
Variables
Variables used in this study include in-
formation asymmetry and herding behavior. 
To examine the hypotheses, this study uses 
three variables that are:  
1. Dependent variable: return dispersion, that 
is deviation of return from its index.
2. Independent variable: market return.
3. Information asymmetry is used as a 
moderating variable.
Model of Analysis
The underlying model of herding 
behavior measurement is Capital Asset Pricing 
Model (CAPM). Model of rational asset 
pricing implies that when market conditions 
are more volatile—i.e. when there are extreme 
market movements—the dispersion of returns 
from the market return will be wider because 
individual stocks have a different sensitivity 
to the market return. However, if the return 
dispersion gets smaller when the market stress, 
it indicates herding behavior. Therefore, based 
on Bhaduri and Mahapatra (2013), the basic 
model in this study is:
Return Dispersiont=α0+α1 |Rm,t| +εt …… (1)
The slope in equation (1) captures a 
positive effect of the dispersion of returns with 
the average market return (as hypothesized 
in the CAPM). The relationship between 
market return and return dispersion depicted 
in the CAPM is linear. During the period of 
relatively large stock price movements, market 
participants do herd around indicators such as 
the average market consensus (Chang et al. 
2000). This large price swing causes higher 
correlation among stock returns. In turn, 
dispersion among returns tends to decrease 
or at least increase at decreasing rate. In other 
words, there is nonlinearity between market 
return and return dispersion. For this reason, 
the square terms of market return are included 
in the model. In short, herding behavior is 
not measured by the large-small dispersion 
of return, but the lack of linearity in the 
relationship between market return and return 
dispersion. Therefore, according to Chang et 
al. (2000), equation (1) was developed into 
equation (2):
Return Dispersiont =  α0+α1 |Rm,t| + α2R2m,t
    +εt ......................… (2)
This study hypothesizes that under 
the condition of herding, individual investor 
beliefs tend to move together toward a 
consensus of all market participants. The 
phenomenon of herding behavior is reflected 
by the negative and significant coefficient of α2 
in equation (2). In order to examine the effect of 
information asymmetry on the phenomenon of 
herding behavior, this study adds information 
asymmetry as moderating variable. Thus, 
the final model used in this study is adopted 
from Chang et al. (2000) and modified by new 
variable i.e. information asymmetry.
Return Dispersiont=α0+α1|Rm,t|+α2 R2m,t+ 
α3AI*+α_4 AI*R
2
m,t+εt ……… (3)
Notes :
Rm,t : market return at time t
AIt : information asymmetry at time t
Based on models (2) and (3), this study 
predicts that α2 and α4 are negative. A negative 
coefficient of α2 in equation (2) points to 
herding behavior phenomenon, and a negative 
coefficient of α
4
 in equation (3) indicates 
that information asymmetry strengthens the 
relationship between Rm
2
 and return dispersion.
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Measurement of Variables
1. Dispersion of return as one of herding 
behavior signals is measured using three 
approaches, namely:
a. Return dispersion measurements using 
Christie and Huang’s approach (hereafter 
abbreviated as CH) in 1995. CH used 
cross-sectional standard deviation 
(CSSD) to measure return dispersion by 
following formula:
b. Measurement of dispersion using the 
approach of Chang, Cheng and Korana 
(hereafter referred as CCK) in 2000. 
In contrast to CH, CCK dispersion 
measured returns using cross sectional 
absolute standard deviation (CSAD) 
with the formula:
c. Measurement of dispersion of returns 
using Bhaduri and Mahapatra’s approach 
(2013) with the formula:
2. Market return (Rm) is measured by 
Indonesia composite index (Hartono 2010). 
Operationally, Rm is measured by the 
formula:
 
3. Information asymmetry (AI) is measured 
by the residual error of bid-ask spread func-
tion (ADJSPREAD) as used by Komalasari 
dan Baridwan (2001).
E(SPREAD) = α0 + α1 PRICEt + α0 TRANSt + 
α0 VARt + α0 DEPTHt + εt
in which:   as used by 
Greenstein dan Sami (1994).
Notes:
Ri,t : stock return of firm i at time t 
Rm,t : market return at time t
Nt : number of firm at time t
Rmean,t : average return at time t
Rmedian,t : median return at time t
Aski,t : highest ask for stock i at time t
Bidi,t : lowest bid for stock i at time t
PRICEt : log normal of average closing 
price at time t
TRANSt : log normal of average volume 
of transaction at time t
VARt : average standard deviation of 
stock return at time t
DEPTHt : log normal of average bid and 
ask volume at time t
εt : residual error. The absolute val-
ue of this residual error is used 
as proxy of information asym-
metry (AI) at time t.
RESULT AND DISCUSSION
Descriptive Statistics
Descriptions of variables used in this 
study are presented in Table 1. It shows that 
average market return is minus 0.24%. The 
low average return in 2008 is due to declining 
in performance of the capital markets as a 
result of economic crisis impact in the United 
States. The standard deviation of information 
asymmetry shows that there is a high volatility 
of information asymmetry data during 2008.
Return dispersion as measured by CSSD, 
CSAD, and γ indicates that CSSD has a higher 
value than the others. This indicates that 
CSSD provides the widest measure of return 
dispersion, while γ is the smallest. This could 
be due to the majority of the median value of 
the average daily return is zero, so the value 
of γ will be closed to the average value return.
Classical Assumption Test
Classical assumption test found that 
the data used in this study did not meet non-
autocorrelation assumptions. However, the 
stationary test indicates that the data used in 
this study are stationary. In order to overcome 
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the problem of autocorrelation, this study 
transformed variables by using Cochrane 
Orcutt method. Based on the transformation 
data, this study did not violate the assumption 
of autocorrelation and other classical 
assumptions. Moreover, this study excluded 
some outliers by removing observations that 
have an absolute studentized residual value 
greater than 3 and Mahalanobis probability 
less than 0.001.
Testing Result and Discussion
Testing result of the first hypothesis 
can be seen in Table 2. Table 2 shows that 
coefficient of α2 is positive and significant 
when using CSSD and CSAD as dependent 
variables. These indicate that there is no 
herding behavior in Indonesia capital market 
during the test period.
Table 2 presents results from estimating 
equation (2). Table 2 shows that coefficient 
α1 is negative and significant for return 
dispersion measured by CSSD and CSAD, and 
insignificant when using γ as a proxy of return 
dispersion. It means that the higher market 
price changes, market participant are more 
likely to follow market consensus. According 
to Christie and Huang (1995), the negative 
coefficient in a linear relationship between 
market return and return dispersion indicates 
herding behavior. Differ from Christie and 
Huang (1995), Chang et al. (2000) argue that 
herding behavior should occur when there 
is large price change as shown by negative 
coefficient of α2.
The coefficient of α2 in Table 2 is 
positive and significant statistically for CSSD 
Table 1
Descriptive Statistics
Variable N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
AI 240 .00009 1.01485 .0674191 .13626534
|Rm| 240 .00014 .10375 .0170265 .01831267
CSAD 240 .01636 .09039 .0292555 .00949638
CSSD 240 -.01982 .11725 .0420782 .01693848
γ 240 -.02650 .02561 .0041589 .00679759
ModAI 240 .00000 .00444 .0001279 .00057964
Rm 240 -.10375 .07921 -.0024155 .02491204
Rm2 240 .00000 .01076 .0006239 .00140448
Notes: ModAI is accronim for moderating variable of information asymmetry
Table 2
Herding Behavior Test 
Return Dispersiont = α0 + α1 |Rm,t| + α2Rm,t2 + εt
Independent 
Variable
Dependent Variable
CSSD CSAD Γ
Unstandardized 
Coefficients
T Sig. Unstandardized 
Coefficients
T Sig. Unstandardized 
Coefficients
T Sig.
Constant 0.0329 30.0374 0.0000 0.0173 29.0025 0.0000 0.0049 9.8030 0.0000
|Rm| (0.3095) (2.8775) 0.0044 (0.1103) (1.7648) 0.0789 (0.0080) (0.1747) 0.8615
Rm² 6.4077 4.6483 0.0000 4.2102 5.2830 0.0000 0.6260 1.0553 0.2923
R² 0.1245 0.2641 0.0216
F-Value 16.7846 42.3426 2.6047
F-Sig. 0.0000 0.0000 0.0760
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and CSAD. It means that very large price 
swing drives higher return dispersion. The 
larger dispersion of returns indicates that 
investors are moving independently from each 
other and do not herd. This behavior indicates 
that there is no herding behavior in Indonesia 
capital market in 2008. This result is consistent 
for two return dispersion’s measurements 
at 5% significance level (α). Since our two 
measurements of return dispersion exhibit 
significance statistically for coefficient α1 and 
α2, so we can ignore one of them.
CSSD has the highest impact on return 
dispersion followed by CSAD and γ. This may 
indicate that CSSD is a better measurement of 
return dispersion than the others.
Influence of information asymmetry on 
herding behavior is presented in Table 3.
Consistent with Table 2, Table 3 shows 
that in two of three models of return dispersion 
(i.e. CSSD and CSAD), coefficient of Rm
2 
(i.e. α2) is positive and significant based on 
5% degree of error, while the information 
asymmetry variable (AI) has a positive and 
significant effect on γ based on 5% significance 
level and insignificant on CSSD and CSAD. 
The negative and significant parameter 
estimate for absolute Rm suggests that over the 
low level of price changes, as price increases, 
the level of return dispersion decrease. This 
result does not support herding behavior 
prediction as suggested by CCK (2000). The 
positive and significant sign on Rm
2 suggests 
that at a high level of price movement, investor 
tends to against the crowds as shown by higher 
return dispersion (CSSD and CSAD).
Information asymmetry (AI) gives no 
significant impact to the degree of dispersion 
of returns as measured by CSSD and CSAD. 
However, when using γ as a proxy for return 
dispersion, this study finds a positive impact 
of information asymmetry. The greater the 
information asymmetry faced by dealers, the 
higher dispersion of returns occurs. It means 
that investment decisions taken by investors 
tend to be far away from market consensus. 
This indicates that speculative actions of 
investor tend to increase when information 
asymmetry is high.
The impact of information asymmetry 
on herding behavior is captured by coefficient 
α
4
. Theoretically, coefficient α
4
 should be 
negative when there is herding behavior. 
Based on Table 3, this study finds that there is 
no herding behavior when there is very large 
market movement (i.e. positive coefficient 
of α2), and the existence of information 
asymmetry suppress the independence of 
investor’s decision (i.e. negative coefficient 
of α
4
). It indicates that high information 
asymmetry triggers herd behavior.
In short, this research finds herd behavior 
when the stock price change is not large. The 
market participant will act independently and 
Table 3
Information Asymmetry Test
Return Dispersiont = α0 + α1 |Rm,t| + α2 Rm,t2 + α3 AI + α4 AI*Rm,t2 + εt
Independent 
Variable
Dependent Variable
CSSD CSAD Γ
Unstandardized 
Coefficients
T Sig. Unstandardized 
Coefficients
T Sig. Unstandardized 
Coefficients
T Sig.
Constant 0.0314 29.6834 0.0000 0.0173 32.2223 0.0000 0.0045 9.2129 0.0000
|Rm| (0.1906) (1.8990) 0.0588 (0.0656) (1.2302) 0.2199 (0.0646) (1.5169) 0.1306
Rm² 4.5625 3.2118 0.0015 3.4294 4.4901 0.0000 0.9046 1.5193 0.1300
AI 0.0098 0.6805 0.4969 0.0117 1.4298 0.1541 0.0294 5.4316 0.0000
AI * Rm² (3.8500) (1.0468) 0.2963 (4.4010) (2.1477) 0.0328 (3.2350) (2.2849) 0.0232
R² 0.0616 0.1955 0.2198
F-Value 3.7612 13.7868 16.4825
F-Sig. 0.0060 0.0000 0.0000
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not follow market consensus when there is 
very large price swing. This result contradicts 
with Chang et al. (2000) who found herding 
behavior in the capital market of South Korea, 
Taiwan, and Japan. This difference may be 
due to differences in method of research and 
capital market profile. 
In sum, this study could not reject the 
null hypothesis. It implies that there is no 
herding behavior in Indonesia capital market 
when testing is done using daily data in 2008 
because it is appeared to be less supportive for 
herding behavior testing. It may be due to the 
impact of the global crisis that not occurred 
throughout 2008. The following are depicted 
charts of the movement of the stock price 
index in 2008.
Figure 3 shows that the biggest 
fluctuations in Indonesia capital market in 
2008 began around July 2008 to early 2009. It 
indicates that further research should be more 
focus on the period of high price fluctuations 
to examine herding behavior. It is suggested 
for future studies to test herding behavior in 
a period of time that matches with the level of 
market fluctuation.
In 2008, trading volume and stock 
index experienced a great decline, forcing the 
authorities to stop trading (blackout) in October 
2008. The stock index dropped dramatically, 
from 2,830 at the beginning of the year to 
1,355 by the end of 2008. In addition, the 
turmoil in the stock market cannot be separated 
by the high proportion of foreign investors 
(more than 60%) in the trading of shares in 
Indonesia (Bank Indonesia 2009). A number of 
losses in the global financial markets led to a 
lot of foreign investors experiencing liquidity 
problems and having to withdraw their funds 
(deleveraging) from Indonesia. In addition, due 
to liquidity problems, the stock market crash 
also allegedly was driven by risk aversion of 
investors who then triggered a shifting of asset 
allocation from risky assets into safer assets 
(Bank Indonesia 2009). This phenomenon 
indicates that the great decreasing in 2008 
may due to the great of capital outflow, not 
merely herding behavior. In this case, it may 
be more difficult to capture herding behavior 
in Indonesia capital market.
Test on information asymmetry indicates 
that information asymmetry is less likely to 
affect return dispersion. However, the most 
interesting result of this study is the impact of 
information asymmetry on herding behavior. 
In particular, when there is asymmetric 
information, investors tend to follow the 
crowds, i.e the higher the information 
asymmetry, investors are more likely to 
ignore their private information and choose to 
follow market consensus. Without considering 
information asymmetry, this study found no 
herding behavior. However, when a setting of 
asymmetric information is included, this study 
Figure 3
Graph of Jakarta Composite Index in 2008  
(Source: Data Processed from Yahoo Finance)
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found the likelihood of herding behavior. 
This implies that information asymmetry is a 
necessary condition for herding behavior.
Finally, the result is highly influenced 
by the measurement of variables. There is 
no ‘true’ formula to detect herding behavior 
based on secondary data. It can challenge 
future research to find the best formula that 
fully reflects herding behavior and to improve 
research methodology.
CONCLUSION
This study examined the phenomenon of 
herding behavior in Indonesia and the effect of 
information asymmetry on herding behavior. 
This study used several alternatives to capture 
the phenomenon of herding. The first approach 
is by using CH method (1995) for measuring 
dispersion return, while the second approach 
using CCK (2000). The difference between 
CH and CCK method is CH using standard 
deviation whereas CCK using absolute 
deviation of individual returns.
Existing studies give more attention to 
the association between herding behavior and 
market conditions, but studies that investigate 
the effect of information asymmetry on 
herding behavior are very limited. Hwang and 
Salmon (2004) stated that intensity of herding 
by institutional investors occurs when the 
market is more stable. This result is reinforced 
by Setiyono et al. (2013) who found the 
phenomenon of herding behavior in Indonesia 
that not only happens in extreme fluctuating 
market conditions but also when the market is 
in a stable condition.
Results of our study found that over the 
low level of price changes, as price increases, 
investors are more likely to follow the crowds, 
but when the price fluctuates largely, there is 
no phenomenon of herding behavior detected 
in IDX in 2008. Non-negative relationship 
on quadratic functions shows that there is no 
herding phenomenon. However, this study 
found that information asymmetry strengthens 
the likelihood of herding behavior. The higher 
the information asymmetry between informed 
traders and uninformed traders pushed 
return dispersion lower. This study implies 
that information asymmetry is a necessary 
condition for the existence of herding behavior. 
Our study can be used to enrich the 
investigation of herding behavior in Indonesia. 
Specifically, future studies need to test the 
level of information asymmetry in Indonesia 
capital market when market condition is stable 
and fluctuative in order to investigate whether 
the phenomenon of herding behavior is 
influenced by market conditions or information 
asymmetry.
The weakness of this study is examining 
phenomenon of herding behavior in 2008 
without making a separation between a period 
of market stress and normal condition. The 
further investigation is suggested to integrate 
between market conditions and level of 
information asymmetry in order to provide a 
more representative result.
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